although more think-tank and civil society actors had become involved in China's foreign policymaking since the 1980s, the role of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained central. He suggested that China's official foreign policy makers tended to distrust scholarly writing on foreign policy (Yu, Bin 1994: 254) . However, that observation is out of date. While a gap does exist between specialists and policy makers, it is narrowing as a more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic policymaking process evolves. Glaser and Saunders (2002: 597) argue that "a more pluralistic and competitive policy environment has given analysts at think tanks more influence. " Lampton also notes that the complexity of foreign policy issues has resulted in the professionalization of China's foreign policymaking, which has given Chinese analysts the opportunity to make significant inputs. Lampton (2001: 8-10) emphasizes that "in the economic arena … the need for specialized research has become increasingly pronounced," and there is a "growing reliance on internal and external research."
According to Shambaugh (2002: 575-576, 581) , "undoubtedly the decisionmaking system has become more consultative over time, with an increased role played by the think tank specialists", so much so that "today they must be considered important actors in the foreign policy making process in the PRC. " To Shambaugh (2002: 581) , the published journals of Chinese foreign policy think tanks "provide very important insights into policy debates that are percolating inside bureaucracies, thus offering important 'early warning indicators' of policies to come. " Tanner (2002: 559) also emphasizes that Chinese think tanks are now "some of the most important windows through which foreign analysts can observe China's usually opaque policy-making system."
While it is widely accepted that Chinese think tanks and analysts can influence China's foreign policymaking, it is difficult to assess the actual influence which varies dramatically and depends on a number of factors. Glaser and Saunders (2002: 608-613) have classified four types of influence: expertise influence based on where an analyst works in the bureaucracy, expertise influence based on the analyst's expert knowledge, personal influence based on the analyst's personal connections with policy makers and experiential influence based on the analyst's career history and personal experience.
Along with the growing influence of Chinese think tanks and analysts, public opinion is emerging as a factor which cannot be ignored. Lampton (2001: 12) regards the increased influence of public opinion in Chinese foreign policymaking as a good example of "corporate pluralization", which refers to "the proliferation of organizations, groups and sometimes individuals in the policy-making process."
It has long been a challenge to assess the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking. Rosenau (1961: 4) noted in 1961 that "we have little reliable knowledge about the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy." Understandably, it is far more difficult to specify the role of public opinion in an undemocratic country like China.
Nevertheless, Fewsmith and Rosen (2001: 186) concluded in 2001 that "public opinion seems destined to play a more important . . . role in Chinese foreign policy in the future." Lampton (2001: 12) is more specific, saying that "some issues and some domestic circumstances allow the leadership less room to operate than others. Leaders understand which issues are so sensitive that to mishandle them could lead to social instability or could provide political competitors an avenue by which to undermine them." Although the issue of FTA can have strong domestic implications, it is not a sensitive issue to the Chinese public. The Chinese public is not well informed and therefore can offer little input to China's FTA negotiations. The Chinese business, however, does play a role by participating in the feasibility studies and the subsequent negotiations.
A slide towards liberalism
Since 1978 when China opened up, Beijing has made a consistent effort to integrate with the international society. One indication is its support for the United Nations and various international regimes. In the 29 years from 1949 when the People's Republic China China's effort to integrate with the international society is a process of learning and accepting liberal norms which were foreign to the Chinese whose world views had been dominated by Marxism-Leninism and a sense of insecurity derived from China's "Century of Humiliation" (1840 Humiliation" ( -1945 when China suffered at the hands of foreign invaders. Since 1978, China has been exposed to Western liberal norms. The end of the Cold War accelerated China's slide towards liberalism. Medeiros and Fravel (2003: 23) noted in 2003 that "in the last ten years, Chinese foreign policy has become far more nimble and engaging than at any other time in the history of the People's Republic."
Evidence of these changes include the expanded number and depth of China's bilateral relationships, new trade and security accords, deepened participation in key multilateral organisations, widening acceptance of many prevailing international rules and institutions and efforts to help address global security issues. percent of China's GDP was generated by merchandise trade in 2004 (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2006: 42; Chen, Taifeng 2005: 62) . In the same year, the figures for the United States and Japan were 25 percent and 26 percent respectively (Xiao and Du, 2007: 2) .
Having benefited from free trade, most Chinese economists have been supportive of global trade liberalization and believe that China should not stop its liberalization process. They often point to the successful examples of free trade and the unsuccessful cases of either protectionism or economic nationalism. One unsuccessful case is Latin America. It is noted that during the 1960s and 1970s, under the influence of economic nationalism, many Latina American countries changed their free trade policy and became more protectionist, which resulted in the unsatisfactory economic performance of these countries since the 1980s (Jiang 2007: 20) .
Chinese analysts (Jiang, 2007: 20-21; Zhang, Zhen 2004: 4-6) Having noted the slow progress and its limited influence in multilateral talks, China has become increasingly interested in the potential for regional trade liberalization, an arena in which it could play a stronger and more effective role (Wang, Qin 2005: 59 ).
China's FTA offensive also reflects Beijing's effort to learn the international economic game and to emulate other counties. The Chinese started their economic reforms with little experience and had to, as Deng Xiaoping said famously, "cross the river by feeling the stones". Although Beijing soon accepted the concept of free trade, it still is playing the catch-up game.
China's FTA policy shift therefore can be a process of learning and emulation.
FTA strategies of the United States and Europe have been particularly influential to China's FTA policy (Zheng, Xianwu 2003: 5-6 (Zheng and Yu 2006: 7) .
To summarise, we may argue that China is interested in liberal absolute gains derived from FTAs. After all, China is deeply involved in global trade and has been its major beneficiary.
Realist Calculations
While China has been on a liberal slide, realism continues to determine Chinese foreign policy. Deng (1998: 320) observed that despite the growing idealpolitik, the dominant thinking of international relations among Chinese analysts was still realist. Lampton (2001: 24-25 ) also noted that "although there is plenty of evidence of increasing Chinese cooperation and conformity with international norms, there is little evidence that considerations of national interest and realpolitik figure any less prominently in Chinese thinking than they always have."
In terms of China's FTA strategy, while the liberal absolute gain has laid a foundation, the selection of FTA partners and the speed and urgency of FTA negotiations are often determined by China's effort to compete for realist relative gains. Zhang Anyuan (2006: 7) warns that compared with the WTO, FTAs cover a broader area and are more discriminative against non-partners. Zhang also notes that even the FTAs that do not seem related to China could have a strong impact on China. Chinese analysts advise Beijing to follow the trend and to join the "small group" of FTAs after joining the "big group" of the WTO in order to avoid being marginalized (Zhang, Fan 2004: 75 
Economic competition
It is generally believed that China's rapid growth of exports is to a great extent due to its cheap labor, raw material and land. China's labor cost in 2003 was just one fiftieth of that in the United States and Japan. However, China's advantage of cheap labor is offset by its low productivity which was only one twenty-fifth of that of the United States and one twenty-sixth of Japan's (Zhang, Huang et. al.2003: 122) . Meanwhile, the costs of labor, raw material and land all have been increasing. It was observed in 2004 that already some leveling of wages was taking place between Hong Kong and Shanghai (Ariff 2003) . It is thus imperative for Chinese producers to continue to reduce the costs so that their products stay competitive in the world market. FTAs are most effective in lowering tariffs and thus substantially reducing the costs of both exports and imports. FTAs could also save costs by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of China's somewhat oldfashioned command enterprises, partly due to the effect of scale and because rationalization and modernization would be stimulated by the new competition (Bi 2005: 15) .
China also attempts to use FTAs to make good use of rules of origin (ROOs) 
Political competition
While economic competition is an apparent factor in China's interest in FTAs, political competition is no less important. In analyzing U.S. FTAs, deLisle (2006) notes that FTAs can serve as an economic instrument in the pursuit of security goals that loom large in U.S. foreign policy. . . More crassly instrumentally, they can serve as economic goodies that Washington can dole out to serve political ends of building or reinforcing alliance-like arrangements.
A similar observation can be applied to China. deLisle (2006) actually points out that "compared to the U.S., the political dimension is even larger for Beijing and the commitment to the relatively radical economic liberalism ideals behind FTAs (or of the broader international trade regime) less established and robust."
Chinese analysts emphasize that China's FTA strategy should help China "enhance its influence in the international political economy and expand its political and security space" (Zhang, Fan 2004: 75) . Therefore, China should make FTAs "an important tool for both economic diplomacy and political diplomacy" (Liu, Changli, 2005: 10) . Thus, Chinese analysts are wary of Japan's effort to negotiate FTAs or EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements) with China's neighbors. They deem it imperative for China to "break up the encirclement of Japan's FTA strategy" (Liu, Changli 2005: 10) .
The reason seems simple-the countries with closer economic relations with Japan will inevitably improve their political relations with Tokyo, which may dilute China's regional leadership potential.
Another political and strategic consideration in China's FTA strategy is Beijing's effort to establish a long-term, reliable supply of overseas resources and energy.
According to the Development Research Centre of the State Council of China (2005), in the years before 2020, China is expected to experience rapid industrialization and China's demand for resources will peak (see Table 2 ). In 2003, the percentages of China's consumption of petrol, lead, copper, nickel, steel, coal and cement in world total were 7, 19, 20, 21, 25, 30 and 50 percent respectively. China's steel demand outstripped the demand in the United States and Japan combined, and the Chinese demand for copper, nickel, zinc, iron ore and cement also surpassed the United States. On the other hand, China's per capita possession of resources is far below world average. Its per capita mineral occupation is about a half of the world average, per capita arable land area and per capita water resources about one third of the world average, per capita forest area only one sixth of the world average, and per capita coal, oil and gas about three fifths, one tenth and one twentieth of the world average respectively. 
Legal competition
Related to economic and political competition is legal competition. The three can hardly be separated. A Chinese analyst argues that for great powers, to play a leading role in regional economic cooperation is not just for their interests in the region or internal benefits (neibu shouyi). More importantly, the great powers are aiming at the external benefits (waibu shouyi), namely to increase their bargaining chips in multilateral negotiations and further to play a leading role in the making of international economic rules (Zhang, Zhen 2004: 5) . While having benefited from its active participation in global trade and investment, Beijing has long believed that the existing international economic order is a part of the "unfair and irrational" international order. Beijing's "fair and rational" international order is based on its vision for a "harmonious world". Chinese China clearly is interested in making changes to the existing international trading system to ensure a "fair and rational" international economic order. Chinese officials have repeatedly pointed out that the WTO decision-making process is dominated by a few states and the views of developing countries are not adequately considered. For instance, as a developing country, China opposes any linkage between trade and labor standards and "the use of environmental standards as a new form of protectionism" (Lardy 2002: 156) . One of China's goals in participating in globalization and joining international economic institutions is to shape the rules of the international trading system (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2004: 12) . It is believed that those who set the international rules have vested interests and they have no intention to let China enjoy the benefits automatically (Liu and Gong 2007: 18) . "An unchangeable rule (tie de faze) is that those who set rules will benefit from the rules", Chinese analysts emphasize (Han et. al. 2005: 7).
China's perceptions of U.S. and EU policies towards China's market economy status highlight its dissatisfaction with some of the existing international trading rules.
While acknowledging that China still needs to continue to marketize its economy, Chinese analysts do not see it a purely economic issue, especially vis-à-vis China's major trading partners. It was noted that early in 2001 the market economy in China surpassed world-recognized threshold of 60 percent and made up 69 percent of the Chinese economy. China thus was well ahead of Russia in terms of economic liberalization (Chen, Taifeng 2005: 184) . Russia, Romania and Bulgaria but not China's is that these countries had changed politically and had moved closer to the United States in their foreign polices (Chen, Taifeng 2005: 188) .
It is no surprise that one of China's goals in multilateral trade talks is to establish uniform (tongyi) market economy criteria (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2005: 107) . Given China's limited influence in international economic institutions, Beijing is unlikely to achieve the goal in the near future. A "more feasible" approach is to enlist as many countries as possible to recognize China's market economy status, which China hopes will impose pressure upon other countries to follow the suit (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2005: 107) . New Zealand was the first developed country to recognize China's market economy status and was rewarded as the first developed country to start FTA negotiations with China is not actively challenging the existing international trading system however. This is partly because China is still learning how to play the international economic game. deLisle (2006) notes that "China has remained largely a 'regime taker'-accepting the existing rules . . . and pledging to abide by them." It is unlikely that we will see a dramatic change in the near future. While suggesting that China should not accept the unfair requirements forced upon China (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2003: 221) ,
Chinese analysts have observed that
China's strategy of actively participating in economic globalization demonstrates that in the process of turning China into a world-class economic power, China accepts the existing international economic order instead of challenging it. Not only does China not challenge this order, it utilizes the order. China will first accept the existing international economic order and then work with other countries, especially the developing countries, to gradually improve it (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2004: 12 ).
China's UN experience shows that it prefers integration first and gradual changes second. Legal competition is thus not a major factor driving China's FTA negotiations. However, with a rapidly growing economy, it may not be long before China starts to leave its mark on the rules of the international trading system. International order evolves with the rise and fall of great powers. As Drezner (2007: 39-42 ) points out, global institutions cease to be appropriate when the allocation of decision-making authority within them no longer corresponds to the distribution of power. A good example is the G-7. The G-7 was moderately successful in managing global macroeconomic imbalances during the 1980s. Today, these economic giants cannot be effective without including in their deliberations economic heavyweight China. Drezner argues that despite the widely shared perception of U.S. unilateralism, the George W. Bush administration has actually made a consistent effort to incorporate emerging powers while placating status quo states.
For instance, the United States has encouraged China to participate periodically in the G-7 meetings of finance ministers and central-bank governors. Also, with a view to giving greater influence to China, the Bush administration has pushed hard to change the voting quotas within the International Monetary Fund.
Understanding China's FTA outcomes
Chinese analysts have had a rather thorough discussion about selecting China's weather, all dimensional" strategic relationship is seriously unbalanced. It is therefore of strategic importance to strengthen the bilateral economic relationship (Huang, Zhao and Bi 2008: 64-65) . In Pakistan, in spite of some economic concerns, the strategic value of an FTA with China is also well recognized. A Pakistani commentary notes that Spanning over five and a half decades, the historic bonds between China and Pakistan are the living example of a relationship based on trust, equity and respect. . . . The FTA is acknowledgement of the realization that to sustain cooperation and . . . nurture the wholistic and strategic relationship, major advances had to be made in the economic fields ("Pak-China FTA" 2006) . Arguably, both China and ASEA would benefit from CAFTA in the long term as the competition resulted from CAFTA would help ASEAN and China to increase the economic efficiency and competitiveness of their business sector and attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (Cai 2003: 401) . Some also argued that the pact would in the longer term be in China's favor as Chinese manufacturers would break into Southeast Asian export markets and the Chinese economy would also benefit from a stable supply of commodities and raw materials (Vatikiotis and Hieber. 2003: 28.) . However, the shortterm economic impacts of the CAFTA on both China and ASEAN were less certain. The impacts could be negative. A key principle for establishing FTAs is the complementarity of the two economies and ASEAN and China were more competitive than supplementary in trade structure. This was reflected in the fact that China and ASEAN were not each other's major export markets. Wong and Chan (2003: 518) noted that from 1980 to 2000, the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) received only an average of 6.4 percent of China's total exports while ASEAN-5's exports to China constituted only 5.5 percent of China's total imports. From the perspective of ASEAN-5, exports to China in this period accounted for only 2.4 percent of its total exports and its imports from China were just 2.6 percent of its total imports. In terms of investment, the FDI share of the ASEAN-5 in China accounted for only six percent in 2001 (Wong and Chan 2003: 523) . Wong and Chan (2003: 526) hence concluded that "there are more possibilities that China and ASEAN would compete, rather than complement one other."
China's strong interest in CAFTA thus cannot be fully explained by economic interests. More incentives can be found in Chinese political and strategic calculations. Lee Kuan Yew (2007: 25) observed that China's decision-making on CAFTA was "based on strategic considerations that override such competing domestic interests as importers versus exporters and agriculturists versus industrialists." Chinese analysts agree that China's decision was, to a great extent, a politically driven move (Qiu 2005: 8-13; Li, Xia 2005: 62) . 6 First of all, to promote China's peaceful rise is particularly important in East Asia.
While China contributed a great deal to the trade within East Asia, its export competition with the newly industrialized economies in the region has increased from eight percent in 1990 to 20 percent in 2002. It is therefore important to coordinate economic interests with ASEAN states, which has strategic implications.
Southeast Asia is geo-politically significant to China, not only because much of China's trade and oil from the Middle East passes through the region but also because of conflicting maritime claims. China, as a rising power, has been a strong supporter for multipolarity in world politics and ASEAN is crucial in that respect. Southeast Asia is also important in China's effort to counter a perceived US containment-of-China strategy and to marginalize Taiwan politically.
To cement closer economic relations with ASEAN would increase China's regional influence at the expense of the United States, Japan and other major economic States. It is predicted that the FTAA will have an even stronger impact on China's exports. An FTA with Chile will give China's traders a beachhead from which to expand their economic activities into the Latin America region and make the FTAA work for China rather than against it (Yang, Zhimin 2004:48-50) . Pablo Cabrera, the Chilean Ambassador to China, said that Chile expected to provide Chinese companies with a new entry point to the American market. "South America, even the whole of America, will become a complete free trade area for China," Cabrera claimed (Liu and Jiang 2005 ).
An FTA with Chile also serves China's energy and natural resources security interest. While China is the world's largest copper importer with its copper consumption accounting for about 22 per cent of world total in 2004 (Chen, Hua 2005) . Chile is the world's largest copper supplier. Chile annually produces 4.9 million tons of copper.
About 850,000 tons are exported to China (Zhang, Jin 2004) . The two countries have already vowed to strengthen co-operation on copper mining. Currently copper accounts for 62 percent to 68 percent of Chilean exports to China (Zhang, Jin 2004) .
Conclusion
Before November 2000 when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji surprised the world with a proposal to establish a free trade area with all ten ASEAN economies by 2010, China had been "more of a follower than a leader when it came to be dealing with multilateral economic arrangement" (Cheng 2006 ). Since then, China has engaged in an FTA offensive and is an influential driving force of East Asian regionalism. As a tradeoriented economy, China has a strong interest in promoting trade liberalization. Concrete benefits include lowering costs, expanding exportation, diverse markets, and helping address the anti-dumping concerns.
China's interest in FTA talks should be examined against the background that "the use of FTAs in geopolitical jockeying is reaching new heights in East Asia" (Caryl 2007 ). Political and strategic considerations can play a decisive role in China's FTA decisions. It is no coincidence that China began its FTA initiatives in Southeast Asia where China has had historical influence that it aspires to re-establish, particularly in rivalry with Japan and the United States. At the same time, FTAs can also be useful vehicles for China to promote its "peaceful development" vision and the notion that China's development is an opportunity rather than a threat to other countries. China's FTA negotiation partners include some resource-rich countries, such as GCC and Australia. In terms of legal competition, China still is in its learning curve. Beijing is relatively new to the existing international trading system and has been focusing on how to make good use of it instead of challenging it. Whom has China been competing with then? The target countries can be specific, but not always. In the case of Pakistan, China is competing with other great powers for strategic interests and for its energy security. In ASEAN, China was mainly competing with Japan and the United States for future regional leadership role. China was also competing with "China threat theory" supporters in that the CAFTA will substantially improve China's image by demonstrating China's rise as an opportunity. The competition factor can be applied to the New Zealand case in that New Zealand played an important role in Chinese campaign for the recognition of its market economy status. Chile, on the other hand, is important to China's broadly defined economic competition in that it can be China's springboard to Latin America. 
